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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

~IEl\IBERS

OF THE UTAH STATE
l\[OTEL ASSOCIATION, through
RALPH D. HOWE, their President,
Plailntiff s,

THEv~.TATE OF UTAH, through its \
TAX COMMISSION, consisting of
ORVILLE GUNTHER, Chairman;
ALLAN M. LIPMAN, ARIAS G.
BELNAP, and HERBERT F.
SMART,
Defendants.

Case
No. 9201

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent substantially agrees with the statement
of facts, as stated by the appellants and recognize that
this action was initiated by the plaintiffs for the purpose of contesting the constitutionality of subsection (f)
of Section 59-15-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. This Section of the Sales Tax Act was passed by the
1
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1959 session of the State Legislature and provides as
follows:
''From and after the effective date of this Act
there is levied and there shall be collected and
paid: ...
(f) A tax equivalent to 2% of the amount paid or
charged for tourist home, hotel, motel, or trailer
court accommodations and services, provided that
this subsection shall not apply to the amount paid
or charged for tourist home, motel, hotel or trailer
court where residency is maintained continuously
under the terms of a lease or similar agreement
for a period of not less than thirty days.''

The action was initiated in the District Court of Salt
Lake County, where it was contended that the above subsection V\7 as in violation of the 14th amndment of the Constitution of the United States and Article I, Section 24
of the Constitution of Utah, in that it was discriminatory and denied plaintiffs equal protection under the
laws.
In response to plaintiffs' complaint, the State Tax
Commission made a motion to dismiss, setting forth nine
separate grounds (R-4), one of which " .,. as, that the plaintiffs' complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted. The trial court requested briefs on
this one point only, and later, in a memorandum decision
(R-21), properly dismissed the action on this point. Although respondent feels that there 'vas merit in the other
eight grounds alleged for dismissal of said case, in the
interest of bringing said matter to a conclusion and having the case decided on its merits, it is the Tax Com2
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mission's desi rt' to ha \~e said case decided upon the
grounds for dismissal applied by the District Court in
making its decision.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
PoiNT I.
APPELLANTS HAVE NOT CORRECTLY INTERPRETED THE MEANING OF SECTION 59-15-4 (f),
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED.
PoiNT II.
THE CLASSIFICATION PROVIDED FOR IN SUBSECTION (f) OF SECTION 59-15-4 IS NOT DISCRIMINATORY OR UNREASONABLE.
PoiNT III.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS'
COMPLAINT BEFORE HEARING EVIDENCE REGARDING THE REASONABLENESS OF THE CLASSIFICATION.

ARGUMENT
PoiNT I.
APPELLANTS HAVE NOT CORRECTLY INTERPRETED THE MEANING OF SECTION 59-15-4 (f),
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED.
Appellants have contended in Point II of their brief
that Section 59-15-4 (f) is unconstitutional because it
does not include certain businesses of a similar nature to
hotels, motels, tourist homes and trailer courts. Among
3
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those businesses which appellants claim to be excluded
are apartment houses, guest houses, dude ranches, resorts
and rooming houses.
It would follow from appellant's highly restrictive
interpretation that the requirement of collecting said
sales tax is to be determined by the name a business gives
itself. Thus, if a business which for a long time has operated as a motel were to call itself an apartment house or
guest house, but continued to provide the same services
as before, then, such business would not be required to
collect the tax.
We do not believe their interpretation to be correct
or substantiated in the law. It is completely unreasonable, contrary to the regulations of the Tax Commission,
contrary to the plain meaning of the statute and contrary to the intention of the Legislature.
Let us examine the statute:
(f) A tax equivalent to 2% of the amount paid or
charged for tourist home, hotel, motel, or trailer
court accommoda.tions and services . . . (emphasis
added)
It is apparent from the italicized words that the Legislature intended to place the tax on a certain class of
accommodations and services. The reference in connection therewith to hotels, motels and tourist homes '""as
not meant to restrict the tax to them as such, but "'"as a
designation of a type of services and accommodations
to be subjected to the tax. The fact that these services
4
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may be afforded by someone not specifically designating
itself as a hotel, motel, or a tourist home, would not
alter any responsibility to collect the tax. If in fact an
apartment or dude ranch were to offer hotel or motel
accommodations, then such transactions would be subject
to the tax.
Prior to the effective date of subsection (f), the
Tax Commission adopted Sales Tax Regulation No. 79,
which reads as follows :
''TouRIST HoME, HoTEL, MoTEL OR TRAILER CouRT

The
terms, tourist home, hotel and motel means any
place that is known to the public as having rooms,
apartments or units to rent, either by the day,
week, or month. The term trailer court means any
place that is known to the public as having house
trailers or space to park a house trailer for rent,
either by the day, week or month. The terms accommodations and services mean any charge made
for the room, apartment, unit, house trailer or
space to park a house trailer, including any
charges made for local telephone, electricity, propane gas, or similar services.

AccoMMODATIONs

AND

SERVIcEs

DEFINED.

''The tax is imposed on ail of the above charges
with the exception that the tax shall not apply
where residency is maintained continuously under
the terms of a lease or similar agreement for thirty
days or more. For the purpose of this regulation,
where continuous residence is maintained for
thirty days or more, and the charge is a monthly
rate, it will be assumed to constitute a lease or
similar agreement (Effective July 1, 1959).''
It is noted that the above regulation was formulated
in accordance with the logical interpretation of the act.
5
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Inasmuch as the Legislature did not see :fit to define
the words, hotel, motel, and tourist home, the Tax Commission adopted a regulation based upon the guidance
given by the Legislature in said act.
In connection with this point, we wish to refer the
Court's attention to some of the numerous cases which
support the proposition that acts of the Legislature are
presumed to be constitutional unless clearly shown to be
otherwise. To cite them all would needlessly burden the
brief with quotations familiar to the Court. The Utah
cases of Parkinson v. Watson, 4 Utah 2d 191, P. 2d 400;
State Water Pollution Board v. Salt Lake City, 6 Utah
2d 247, 311 P. 2d 370; and NorL·ille v. State Tax Comrnission, 98 Utah 170, 97 P. 2d 937, hold that "~here two
meanings can be given an act, one constitutional and
the other unconstitutional, the Court \Yill interpret the
law to make it constitutional.
Appellants have referred to situations \Yhere construction workers or others may reside temporarily in private
homes and escape paying the tax. It may possibly be
true, as in the administration of any tax la\Y, that there
may be isolated instances not kno,rn to the Tax Comrnission 'v here the tax is not charged. It is also possible
that appellants could scout around and find a fe\Y such
instances; but to claim that such 'Yould make the act unconstitutional, is like claiming the entire sales tax la"T
is unconstitutional because a huckster parks his truck
along the road to sell oranges and then makes it out of
the state without reporting and paying the tax.
6
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

PoiNT

II.

THE CLASSIFICATION PROVIDED FOR IN SUBSECTION (f) OF SECTION 59-15-4 IS NOT DISCRIMINATORY OR UNREASONABLE.
Respondent agrees with the holdings in all of the
cases cited in Point I. of appellant's brief and has no
dispute with the recognized body of law forbidding the
enactment of dis crimina tory, capricious, or arbitrary
statutes.
With respect, however, to the reasonableness of
taxing statutes, the following statement from the case of
Roth Drugs v. Johnson (Cal.) 57 P. 2d 1002, clearly summarizes the existing law:
''The Supreme Court of the United States has definitely held that the Fourteenth Amendment of
the Federal Constitution, which guarantees to all
citizens equal protection to personal privileges
and property rights, does not forbid reasonable
discriminaions in matters involving taxation.
Classifications for the purpose of taxation are recognized as necessary and valid. In making such
classifications a sound discretion is accorded the
Legislature; every reasonable presumption in support of the classification will be indulged in and
if it can be reconciled on any reasonable and natural theory it will be upheld.''
As to the particular statute under consideration it
is to be noted that Utah is not the only state to have
laws imposing a sales tax upon the type of accommodations and services in question. At least eight of our
sister states have similar statutes.

7
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These states are: Washington, Section.82-04-020, Revised Code of Washington ; Missouri, Section .144-020,
Revised Statutes of Missouri; North Carolina, Section
104-164-4, General Statutes of North Carolina; Arizona,
Section 42.;.1314, Arizona Revised Statutes, Annotated,
as amended· Florida Section 212-03, Florida Statutes,
'
'
1957; Tennessee, Section 67-3002, Tennessee Code Annotated, as amended; Kansas, Section 79 :3603(g), Kansas
General Statutes, Supp of 1957; and Louisiana, Section
47:301 (14) (a), Louisiana Revised Statutes.
'

An examination of the above laws seems to indicate
that they are intended primarily to tax aecommoda.tions
to tourists and transients. Although the tax base is
broader in some states than in others, and the time or
period used as a breaking point for distinguishing a resident from a tourist does in some cases differ, the widespread adoption by states of such acts, points up the
general recognition of such la,vs as a legal source of
state revenue.
In two of the above-named states, Florida and Arizona, the constitutionality of the statutes haYe been questioned, and in both instances upheld. Appellants have
cited these cases in their brief but respondent submits that
a reading of the same will clearly indicate that they support the contentions of the State Tax Commission.
In the case of Ga,ulden v. Kirk (Florida) 47 So. 2d,
567, the Court, in answering the alleged claim of unconstitutionality because of discrimination, stated at page
567 of the Southern Reporter, as follows :
8
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''Certainly it was appropriate for the Legislature
to place the business of the landlord who rents to
transients in a different class from that of the
landlord who rents to permanent guests or tenants.
These landlords may be in the same general class
- assuredly both of them are engaged in renting
living accommodations - but the distinction made
between their respective businesses for the purpose of taxation under the provision of this Act
is permissible classification and is not unreasonable, arbitrary, or unjustly discriminatory. The
landlord who rents to transients rather than permanent tenants charges higher per diem prices,
must (because of the very nature of his trade or
enterprise) give strict daily attention and supervision to his business and guests and operates in
a special, distinct class - possibly a more lucrative field. It was necessary to establish some
period of time which would mark the difference between a transient and a permanent guest. In its
wisdom the legislature saw fit to establish six
months' residence as the criterion. Such period of
time constitutes a reasonable basis for the cleva.ge
·of the two classes of tenants and this distinction
is ample justification for the difference in classification of the businesses engaged in by the landlords. Such division or classification is recognized generally throughout the business world;
indeed, in the hotel and apartment trade the difference between the business of furnishing living
accommodations to transients and the business of
supplying living accommodations to permanent
guests or tenants is well known and accepted.
Many hotels cater largely, if not exclusively, to
so-called commercial or transient guests. Moreover, we take judicial notice of the ~act that the
tourist business in this State is one of our greatest
economic assets. Our winter, and for that matter
our summer, visitors usually enjoy the famed
9
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year-around climate with which we fortunate~y
have been endowed, for less than six months In
each year. If they remain longer, they should be
extended the privilege of being classified as permanent guests or tenants and the landlord's business thereby removed from the classification of
furnishing living accommodations to transients.
The six months basis of differentiation is reasonable and does not amount to unjust or arbitrary
discrimination.''
From the above case we learn that the Florida act
has a broader base in that it includes some rentals paid
for apartment house accommodations and that it extends
to six months the time in which the tax applies. This
would not be m1reasonable in view of the fact that Florida, with its mild winter climate, caters to a tourist trade
in which the tourist remains for several months rather
than a short period of time as is the case in the State of
lT tah. The thirty -day period i11 Utah, in ne-w of the
nature of our tourist trade, is just as logical and reasonable as a six-month period for the State of Florida.
It should also be noted that in Utah a motel owner
is not required to collect tax from guests 'Yho rent on a
monthly basis. It is generally recognized that motels in
the State of Utah will often rent their accommodations
for longer periods of time during the "~inter months.
When doing so, such guests then fit into a class similar
to those who rent apartments on a monthly basis. As to
this class, the Legislature did not intend this sales tax.
In the Arizona case of White v. Moore, 46 P. 2d 1077,
the question arose as to the taxability of offiee spare,
under the statute imposing a tax upon hotels, guest
10
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houses, dude ranches, and resorts, rooming houses, apartment houses, automobile rental services, automobile storage garages, parking lots, tourist camps, or any other
business or occupation, charging storage fees or rents.
It was contended that the Act would be discriminatory
unless office space was so included. In rejecting this contention the Court stated as follows:
"A mere reading ... suggests that in selecting the
businesses the Legislature had in mind occupations through which runs a common thread or
purpose . . . Those supplying accommodations,
either wholly or in part, for tourists or transients,
such, for instance, as guest houses, dude ranches
and resorts, hotels or tourist camps. One reading
... finds it difficult, if not impossible to escape
the conclusion that only businesses possessing
these respective characteristics were intended to
be included in these groups.
"It must be kept in mind that a privilege tax is
not a tax on property, but a tax on the right to
engage in business and that the Legislature may
impose it on any any class or classes of business
it cares to and decline to apply it to others, its
only limitation in this respect being that the classifiication it makes must be reasonable, not arbitrary or discriminatory, and such that all those
falling within the same class will be treated alike.
We are unable to see a violation of this requirement in a statute imposing a tax on the gross
income of those engaged in the business of furnishing living accommodations to tourists or transients and not imposing it on the income of those
who rent offices and storerooms. The former are
activities or businesses of a particular type, and
it is plain that their common characteristic, the one
that guided the Legislature in naming them, is
not possessed by the latter.''
11
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Respondents have beei1 unable to find any cases holding. a statute similar to the one under. consideration
unconstitutional, and no such authorities have been cited
in appellant's brief. The weight of authority clearly
supports the position of the Tax Commission.
PoiNT III.
THE TRIAL COURT-· DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS'
COMPLAINT BEFORE HEARING EVIDENCE REGARDING THE REASONABLENESS OF THE CLASSIFICATION.If the trial Court interpreted Section 59-14-4 (f) in
the manner contended by the respondent to impose a tax
upon a type of service or accommodation, rather than
upon any specific business, then there \v-ould be no exemption for competitors in the same type of business
and thus no need for the introduction of any evidence.
Appellants have never at any time indicated how, or
what type of evidence could possibly help their position.
Further the appellants never objected to the trial
Court's hearing and ruling upon respondent's motion
without evidence, until this appeal was taken. Both parties argued the constitutional issue on its merits in the
District Court and both parties submitted briefs on this
issue. Appellant cannot now bring up a point which
was never raised in the lower Court.

12
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CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted by the Tax Commission
that the decision of the District Court in granting the
Defendants' motion to dismiss should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

WALTER L. BUDGE,
Attorney General,

BEN E. RAWLINGS,
Special Assistant Attorney
General
Attorneys for Respondent
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